According to the article located here:
Intel SGX hardware is vulnerable to a speculative execution-based attack. Intel has addressed these vulnerabilities by updating the microcode where every time the processor leaves execution of an enclave, it also flushes the level 1 cache and other fixes. However, according to the article, “These cases don’t, however, completely eliminate the risks, especially when hyperthreading is used. With hyperthreading, one logical core can be within SGX, hypervisor, or SMM code, while the other logical core is not. The other logical core can thus snoop on level 1 cache, and the extra cache flushes can’t prevent this (though they can certainly make it less convenient, due to the increased chance of a flush occurring during an attack).”
What solutions are being offered in the short and long term to address these vulnerabilities? How will Enigma adapt to evolving threats? Once MPC is up and running does this eliminate this threat entirely (i.e. is the reliance on TEEs completely removed)?